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1954 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE 4823 
prior to his h. ving atTived t>n the scene. 
it might have th: •n " lit~~ tlme to dig 
in and get the facts, because he was not 
present when these events occurred. 
Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. But he was 
on the scene when Mr. Hollyday was 
fired. 
Mr. CAPEHART. Yes. he was; and I 
think that before our investigation Is 
concluded. the Senator from Texas will 
l;e well sati~fled with it. 
1\!r. JOHNSON of Texas. But Mr. 
Hollyday was an appointee of this ad-
ministration. 
Mr. CAPEHART. He was an ap-
pointee of this administration; there is 
no question about that. 
Mr. WILLIAMS. Mt'. President, will 
the senator from Montana yield to me 
for 2 minutes? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield, provided 
I do not lose my ri~ht to the floor. 
1\Ir. WILLIAMS. I am not interested 
In getting into the controversy as to 
which administration or which public 
official might be responsible. I wish to 
commend the Senator from Virginia !Mr. 
BYRDI upon the report which he has 
made. I think the one thing we should 
keep before us is not the question as to 
who might have been responsible. but 
rather the fact that thousands of home-
owners throuchout the country have lost 
millions of dollars. I am confident that 
the Senator from Virginia will pursue the 
investigation which he has started-
and render his report to the Congress. I 
hope that those who are responsible in 
either administration \,_.ill be brought to 
justice. letting the chips fall where they 
may. 
Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, will the 
Senator from Montana yield? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield to the Sen-
ator from New York for not to exceed 
2 minutes. provided I do not lose my 
right to the floor. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection. it Is so ordered. 
Mr. LEHMAN. I was present at the 
meeting of the Committee on Banking 
and Currency this morning, and voted 
to carry on an ilwestigation, because I 
think the alleged facts concerning Fed-
eral Housing certainly merit and require 
such an investigation. 
But as to the hearing this morning 
at which Mr. Cole testified. I was not 
at all impressed with the contention that 
the blame. or even a great part of the 
blame. rested with previous Democratic 
administrations. 
After all. the Republicans have been 
in office for 15 months, and from the 
testimony which was given there was no 
Indication that any effective steps had 
been taken to correct the situation which 
it is alleged has existed and which prob-
ably shall exist. Certainly, there was 
nothing whatsoe,·er in the statement of 
Mr. Cole to Indicate that, so far as Title 
I Is concerned. there were any steps at 
nil taken until very recently to stop 
the inequitous alleged practice of en-
cout·aging costly and unnecessary re-
pairs to houses. the loans on which have 
been guaranteed by the Government. 
Certainly nothing has been developed 
thus far which would Indicate that the 
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blame is wholly or even in greater part go to Geneva with a clarity and a unity 
ascribable to Democratic administra- · of purpose which will stand up against 
Uons. I shall listen to the investigation that of the Communists? Or will they 
with great attention. I felt It my duty stumble into the conference. each in his 
to vote for the investigation, and I shall own peculiar way and for his own lmme-
watch its course with full care. I would, diatc ends? Will the non-Communist 
however. urge upon the distinguished powers know beforehand and establish 
chairman of the committee, on which I beforehand the minimum conditions 
have the honor to serve, to withhold his that are essential to prevent Commu-
judgment and his comments until the nist control of Indochina and beyond, 
investigation has proceeded further to all of southeast Asia? 
its conclusion. These were the quettions which led me 
Mr. CAPEHART. I assure the Sen- to raise the issue of Indochina on the 
ator from New York that I share his floor of the Senate several weeks ago; 
hope. I trust that poll~ics can be com- these questions. and, as I mentioned be-
plete!y left out of the PICture. fore, a desire to lift the obscurity which 
Mr. LEHMAN. I 11ope so. has surrounded this subject and kept 
Mr. CAPEHART. I think they can knowledge of it from the American 
be. and that we should try to see to it people. 
that that is done. I simply '~!shed to Since that time we have had more 
keep the RECORD straight rn these light on the Indochinese situation. The 
respects. . vicious battle at Dicn Bien Phu has 
Mr. LEHMAN.. I. too, have spoken m helped to focus the attention of the press 
the hope of keepmg the REcORD straight. on the situation. The Secretary of State 
LAST CHANCE IN INDOCHINA 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. Pr~sident, on 
March 22, I addressed the Senate on In-
dochina. My 1·easons for doing so were 
twofold. I wanted. first of all, to call 
attention to this obscure area of crisis 
in Asia. It was my hope that In alerting 
the Senate, I would also alert the Amer-
ican people. As a Nation we have an 
enormous stake In the outcome of this 
crisis. 
Beyond the desire to bring the Indo-
chinese situation to the attention of the 
Senate. I had a second reason in dis-
cussing the matter several weeks ago. 
At the end of this month, the four major 
powers, Great Britain, France, the 
United States. and the Soviet Union, 
will convene at Geneva-v:lth Commu-
nist China as an interested state-to 
consider the situation in the Far East. 
This confet·ence may well represent the 
climax of the bitter. ruthless. war in In-
dochina. It may decide whether the 
future of the 27 million Inhabitants of 
the area shall veer toward freedom or 
totalitarianism. It may determine 
whether this country and other free na-
tions shall again be subjected to a direct 
aggression launched from east Asia. 
It may cast the die for or against 
western European unity. In this 
shrunken world of ours all events are in-
ten·elated. The decisions on Indochina 
taken at Geneva will echo not only 
throughout Asia but in Europe and our 
own country as well. 
The Chinese Communists and the 
Russians will enter the Geneva Confer-
ence in a united front. There is not 
likely to be any pushing and pulling be-
tween them. There Is little doubt as to 
what they want and what they will try 
to obtain at Geneva so far as Indochina 
is concerned. They will seek what they 
have always sought. They will seek in-
ternational Communist domination of 
this region. or, at the very least, the 
conditions for Communist domination 
in the future. 
But what of the non-Communist 
powers at Geneva? Will they know just 
as clearly what they want? Will they 
, 
is now In Europe confen·ing with the 
Western European Powers. The admin-
istration last week finally took several 
Members of Congress into its confidence. 
I regret to say. however, that, to the best 
of my knowledge, the administration has 
not yet seen fit to include the chairman 
and the ranking minority members of 
the House Foreign Atrail'S committee or 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
In its trust. I hope that this was not an 
intentional ovet'S!ght, and that it will be 
rectified before the opening of the con-
ference in Geneva.. 
Light has also been shed on the Indo-
chinese crisis by the illuminating re-
marks which have been made on the 
floor of the Senate in recent days. I re-
fer to the admirable addresses of the 
Senator from Iowa lMr. GILLEm:] on 
April 5 and that of the Senator from 
Massachusetts lMr. KENNEDY! on April 
6. I commend these addresses and the 
remarks of the distinguished majority 
leader !Mr. KHowLANDJ, the able Senator 
from Washington lMr. JACKSON). the 
able Senator from Mississippi (Mr. Sr&N· 
NrsJ. and others to those Members of 
the Senate who were unable to be present 
when they were delivered. I commend 
them for their penetrating analysis of 
the problem. their sincerity, and their 
forthright facing of the facts. 
While the Senate may discuss this 
problem. and the press may w1·ite about 
it, the President and the Secretary of 
State must bear the responsibility for 
dealing with the situation. They, and 
they alone, must lay down our official 
policy, with respect to Indoehina,ln clear 
and unmistakable language. 
On March 30, Secretary Dulles ad-
dressed himself to this policy In a speech 
before the Overseas Press Club. He has 
since elaborated on that statement on 
several occasions. His current conversa-
tions In France and Britain lend addi-
tional emphasis to the policy. 
It Is clear now that the administra-
tion believes our strategic stake In Indo-
china. Is very great. It is also clear that 
we have been committed very deeply in 
Indochina, probably even to the extent 
of military action by American forces. 
J 
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It Is not clear, however, that the POli-
cies of the administration have yet es-
tablished the minimum conditions to 
prncnt Communist seizure of Indochina 
without full-scale war. It is not clear 
that these cond1Uons are even under-
stood by the administration. 
It is for this reason that I have sought 
the floor today to ~peak again on Indo-
chma. In a few days the Secretary of 
State will be In Geneva. When that 
tJmc comt's, it v.ill be too late to im-
provise solutions. It will be too late to 
prevent a settlement negotiated from 
weakne<s rather than strength. It will 
be too late, in short, to keep Indochina 
from fallmg or slipping Into the net of 
Communist totahtarianism. or, perhaps, 
this country from an equally disastrous 
full-scale military Involvement In the 
conflict. 
The Secretary will co to Geneva with 
the best wishes of all of us for success. 
His burden will be great, and he will need 
the support of a united Nation. Al-
though there has not been the kind of 
bipartisan consultation that there should 
have been from the very beginning on 
this and other Issues, he shall not lack 
bipartisan SUPPOrt In his mission. The 
Secretary will cary to Geneva our hopes 
for a solution that will end the bloodshed 
in Indochina, if he can accomplish this 
without the loss of Indochina to the 
Communists. 
But are hopes enoul!"h? Are hopes a 
substitute for the actions which are 
necessary, which must be taken to pre-
vent either a St'ttlement of appeasement 
or our full military commitment In Indo-
china? 
When r SPOke on March 22, I said: 
There Is still time, even before the 
(len••• conference open!!, to rally the forces 
or freedom to meet the 61tuatlon In Indo-
chin~>. There I~ atlll Ume to asoert a pooltl,·e 
purpo<cful lcnd<TOhlp. There Is still ume, 
but It lA running short. Will we make use 
or It before It tatoo~~~? 
Mr. President. I ask that question 
again, today: Will we make use of the 
time that is left us before it is too late? 
In these remaining days the free nations 
have, I belleve, wl1at may be a last 
chance in Indochina. 
I am not an alarmist. I do not wish 
to sucgest that the world will be turned 
upside down overnight by what Is or is 
not done at Geneva. I do believe, how-
ever. that patterns may be set at Geneva 
which will determine the futu1·c not only 
of Indochina but of all southC'ast Asia. 
Patterns may be set which might well 
influence the entire POlitical fabric of 
the French Republic and touch on every 
aspect of Western European unity. Pat-
terns may be set which wlll determine 
whether aggression shall again gathe1· 
force on the shores of the South China 
sen.s to be hw-led at this Nation !rom 
acroos the Pacific. This was the pattern 
o! the Japanese aggression in the last 
decade. Will it be the pattern o! another 
totalitarian a~;sresslon out of the East 
in the next? 
This need not be the case If the free 
nations sec clearly their objectives in 
Indochina, and act boldly and firmly to 
achieve them. 
What are the objectives we seek? 
What are these objectives for which the 
French have fought so long? 
What are the obJect.ives for which we 
have already provided probably $2!2 
billion of aid to SUPPOrt the war In 
Indochina? 
What are the obJectives for which 
thousands of Indochinese natlonaltsts in 
the three Associat~ States of Vietnam, 
Laoo, and Cambodia have risked their 
lives, for w•hich brother has fought 
brother in this ugly, shadowy war of the 
jungles and the deltas? 
These objectives have often been de-
scribed in unflattering terms by those 
who oppese our pat·ticipation in the con-
flict. They will a.sl'ert that the French 
are in Indochina to cling to an out-
moded empire for profit or for reasons 
of false pride. They will declare that 
the Indochinese nationaltsts who OPPO~C 
the Communists are corrupt, and serv-
ants of the French. They will say that 
the United States POUrs out its wealth 
for imperialistic ends, or if not because 
of imperialism. out of stupidity. 
Let me say that elements that arc baso 
and unworthy manage to Infiltrate Into 
all worthwhile undertakings. I have no 
doubt that this is no less true In the 
Indochinese situation than It is In any 
other human situation. But I find It 
hard to believe that unworthy clements 
or motivations are prePOnderant In In-
dochina. I find it hard to believe that 
year aft~r year the French people would 
countenance the spilling of the blood of 
their sons for a base purpe.se. I find 
it hard to believe that the President of 
the United States and the administra-
tion would associate this country with 
a base purPOOe and would underwrite Its 
cost at a current rate of more than a 
billion dollars a year. I t\nd lt hard 
to believe that the Indochinese natlonal-
tsts would continue In this strug~:le, 
would risk their lives and fortunes, for 
a base PurPOse. 
If there were a significant degree ot 
truth in these cynical charges, it would 
have been the duty of the President and 
the Secretary of State to have rePOrted 
it to the American people long ago. It 
would have been their duty to adjust 
American foreign policies accordingly. 
They have not so rePOrted. They have 
intensified, rather than changed, their 
policy of commitment In that area. 
There must be, then, only one reason 
for pursuing the struggle in Indochina. 
It is the only reason which makes sense. 
In this reason, the Interests of the 
French, the Indochinese. and ourselves 
converge. It ls that the people of the 
Indochinese states shall have a right to 
work out their destiny in freedom. se-
cure from the threat of alien domination 
which presently emanates from Com-
munist China. This is the sole practical 
aim. and the only morally justified aim 
for the sacrfices that are being made. 
If we can realize this aim, each nation 
who participates In the struggle will 
serve its own best interests. 
The French will be able to withdraw 
In time from Indochina, !rom this strug-
gle which has cost them so dearly. They 
will be able to withdraw, not. in disgrace, 
not In humiJilltion, but lro «:ecping with 
the finest tr; ,'ition of /.:.eir civilization. 
They will withdraw with a sense of mis-
sion fulfilled. They will have made one 
more contribution to the growth of world 
freedom and culture. Mr. President, the 
French will find that the bonds they have 
forged over the last century with the 
Indochinese will be stronger in the 
equality of Uberty than they were when 
Indochina was admintstered In inequal-
Ity as a colony. The French then will 
be able to turn their great diplomatic 
and military capacities to Europe and 
the solution of Its many pressing prob-
lems. 
For ourselves, the freedom of the peo-
ple of Indochina and their security from 
a~:grcssive totalitarianism are all we seek. 
Thcy will be ample recompense for the 
contributions we have made to the strug-
gle. If Indochina emerges free, it will 
mean that our country will be safe from 
a rcpeti tlon of the kind of aggression 
that In the last decade plunged us into 
World Wa1· II. International commu-
nism will be denied strategic military 
bases from which to launch such an 
aggression. It wlll be denied the stra-
te~lc raw materials of Indochina and 
the rest of southeast Asia. It will be 
denied the surplus rice of the area-the 
tice on which the armies of Asia march. 
If Indochina emerges free, moreover, 
It will mean an extension of fundamental 
principles in which we believe. These 
arc the principles which brought free-
dom to this nation in 1776, and so recent-
ly have found renewed expre..<sion in the 
Philippines, Indonesia, Burma, India, 
and Pakistan. 
Mr. President. for the peoples of the 
three associated states of Indochina, 
success in this united endeavor will open 
an era of liberty. They shall have the 
OPPOrtunity to deal in their own way, 
and In keeping with their own national 
genius, with the accumulated ills of cen-
turies past and the challenges of the 
future. 
This, then, !! I may repeat it, ts the 
real purPOse of the struggle: the com-
plete freedom of the three states of Indo-
china, Viet Nam, Laos, and Cambodia, 
and their security from aggressive, total-
itarian domination. 
Mr. President, when I returned from 
Indochina, last October, I reperted to 
the Foreign Relations Committee and to 
the Senate that a satisfactory solution 
to the conflict was possible. I indicated 
then that there were three essential ele-
ments In the solution: first, that the 
French stay with the military situation 
until such time as the Indochinese na-
tionalists had gathered sufficient 
strength to defend themselves; and fur-
ther, that the French pursue a course 
leading to the establishment of genuine 
independence In the area; second, that 
the United States continue to supply the 
materials needed by the non-Commu-
nist forces, but refrain from committing 
its own armed strength In the area; 
third, that the three nationaJ.tst states 
put down roots in their respective peo-
ples and develop the wUl to fight for 
freedom and the necessary popular sup-
POrt to gain it. 
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Mr. President. why, first of all, Is It 
necessary for the French military forces 
to remain in Indochina for the present? 
It is necessary for this reason, if none 
other: their withdrawal at this time 
would bring about the immediate col-
lapse of nationalist resistance. Native 
armies have not yet been formed that 
can stand alone against the Communist-
led Viet Minh. The latter have been 
building their military strength for 
years, and arc heavily supported from 
Communist China. Early in this strug-
gle the Viet Minh Communists wrapped 
themselves in the cloak of nationalism 
and social reform, and so developed con-
siderable popular support. This cloak, 
although tattered by the obvious nature 
of Chinese Intervention. still remains 
relatively intnct. It will take time for it 
to disintegrate. By the same token it 
will take repeated assurances-deeds. not 
words-to convince the people of Indo-
china that the nationalists. rather than 
the Communists. really represent their 
best Interests and their hopes for full 
independence from colonial rule. 
Until these two Ideas are firmly es-
tablished-namely, that the Viet Minh 
are the tools of International commu-
nism, while the nationalists represent 
true freedom and national progress-
the vast majority of the Indochinese 
people at best will continue to sit on the 
fence. At worst. they will actively op-
pose the national governments of the 
three states. the French, and ourselves. 
These are blunt and unpleasant words, 
but the time has come to speak them. 
French military support, then. is es-
sential if resistance to communism in 
Indochina Is to be maintained until the 
nationalist governments are able to 
stand on their own feet. So, too, is con-
tinued material support from this coun-
try. France, heavily committed in 
Europe and elsewhere. cannot alone bear 
this financial burden, or even a major 
part of it. The national governments 
or the three states do not begin to com-
mand the necessary resources. Without 
our continuing material aid, as without 
the French military c1Iort. the resistance 
to communism in Indochina would col-
lapse. 
Without the determination of the In-
dochinese nationalist leaders to establish 
themselves firmly in the hearts of their 
people. the c1Iort In Indochina is also 
doomed to eventual failure. It will not 
be easy for some of these leaders so to 
establish themselves. Many of them are 
former ofllcials of the French colonial 
system. Some are still French citizens. 
Others have permitted their French 
training to separate them from their 
people rather than to equip them to help 
their people. I do not condemn these 
leaders for this state of affairs. I do 
say, however. that the time has come for 
them to lead; and if they are to lead 
they must. be willing to work with and 
through their people. The tides of na-
tionalism arc sweeping through Indo-
china. They are powerful, irresistable 
tides. Those who understand the tides, 
those who do not. fear them, will sail with 
them-and, in the long run, only those. 
In this way lies the hope of rallying 
popular support to the national govern-
ments of the three states. In this way 
genuine national armies can be built 
which will remain loyal to the cause of 
these governments. 
It these three elements-French mili-
tary and political action aimed at Inde-
pendence. continued aid from the United 
States. and popular leadership on the 
part of the national governments-had 
been present in the past, we would be go-
ing into the Geneva conference with 
high hopes for a successful termination 
of the conftict. As it Is. we face that 
conference under a threatening cloud of 
appeasement. 
What has gone wrong? Where docs 
the failure lie? It does not lie ln the 
French military effort. The French 
Union forces in the area number 10 light 
divisions of 240,000 men. Twenty-six 
per cent of the commissioned officers of 
France and 37 percent of the noncom-
missioned are serving in Indochina. The 
French have lost 16,000 killed. Dien 
Bien Phu is not a symbol of military de-
featism. It is a symbol of the highest 
courage and devotion to duty. The re-
sistance of this isolated fort is in keep-
ing with the finest tradition of the value 
of French arms. 
Nor does the failure lie in the falter-
ing of American assistance. The flow of 
aid has been stepped up steadily until 
it now meets, at the least, all reasonable 
demands of the French-Indochinese 
forces. It covers three-quarters of the 
total cost of the Indochinese war. 
So great has been this aid that, in my 
opinion, It has carried us to the brink of 
full-scale involvement. We have sent 
equipment. We have sent technicians. 
We are even paying for General Chen-
nault's private flyers to help supply the 
resistance. Can we go much further 
without war? I have never heard a se-
rious complaint voiced on the inade-
quacy of American aid. I have never 
heard a serious opinion advanced to the 
effect that the inte1·vention of American 
combat forces, except on a massive scale, 
would make a significant difference ln 
the military situation in Indochina. 
And I do not believe that there should 
be such intervention. If the war In In-
dochina. is a part of the larger resistance 
to totalitarian agg1·ession, the sacrifices 
must be equitably borne by the free na-
tions. We have curled ow· share of the 
fighting in Korea. As the distinguished 
majority leader has pointed out, we have 
a right to expect others to carry theirs 
in this conflict. 
As it is now, the anti-Communist 
armed forces total more than 500,000 
men as against a Vletminh Communist 
military strength, both regular and Ir-
regular. which does not exceed 300,000 
effectives. The Chinese Communists 
ship these forces probably 5,000 tons of 
supplies a month. for which, according 
to reliable reports, they pay In opium 
and raw materials. We ship the French 
and the nationalist forces many thou-
sands of tons more a month for which 
they do not pay. 
If it were a matter of mllltary aid 
alone, this war would have long since 
ended in victory. But it is not a matter 
of American military aid alone, just as 
it Is not a matter o:C the French milltary 
errort alone. The tendency to think of 
the struggle in Indochina as a purely 
military one has only served to obscure 
the real source or the difficulty. 
In my opinion, the failure lies not ln 
the military but in the political realm. 
We have lost sight of the fundamental 
objective. If I may reiterate that objec-
tive. the only realistic objective. it Is 
that the peoples of the Indochinese 
states shall have a right to work out 
their destiny in freedom. secure from the 
threat or totalitarian domination. 
Last July 3, the French announced, 
In e1Icct. that independence for the 
three states of Laos. cambodia, and Viet 
Nam was their political objective in the 
struggle In Indochina. Months have 
gone by but the specific agreements to 
carry out this pledge have yet to be nego-
tiated except In the case of Laos. 
I believe such agreements will eventu· 
ally be reached but will they be reached 
in time? Unless it Is clear that the 
national governments of the three states 
have a future that Is unequivocally free, 
they will not really fight in this struggle. 
M01·eover. without a clear-cut promise ot 
full freedom. no native army is likely to 
be formed in Indochina which can be 
trusted not to go over to the enemy 
once It has been trained and equipped 
and the opportunity presents itself. 
Without this promise, there will be 
neither victory nor honorable peace in 
Indochina. 
From the French point of view. the 
delay In reaching the agreements stems 
primarily from the desire that the three 
states remain within the French Union. 
To this. I can only say that there is 
no true union which is not based on the 
equality and the free will of the partners. 
I cannot believe that France, the spirit 
of France which is one of the strongest 
forces of liberty in the Western World, 
would countenance for long any other 
kind of union. I do not know if the 
Indochinese states will elect to remain 
In the French Union once they have ob-
tained their freedom. I do know that if 
they are compelled to remain against 
their wish, they will make sorry part. 
ncrs. 
I may also point out that the entire 
experience In the transition from colo-
nialism to self-government since the end 
of World w ar n clearly illustrates the 
wisdom of permitting a free choice in 
this matter. Our bonds with the Philip-
pines have never been more secure or 
Intimate than they are today. The pres-
ent relations between Britain and Pakis-
tan and India are on a level of coopera• 
tion and cordiality that was never 
matched during the era of colonial coer· 
c1on. If there is any lesson to be learned 
from these experiences. it is that the 
good which exists in the ties between a 
colonial country and a holding power Is 
heightened and made more enduring in 
freedom and equality. It these rights 
are denied a colonial country beyond the 
time or their ripening, then the good 1n 
the ties will be lost in a passion of mu-
tual hatred and resentment. 
The desire for national freedom and 
equality is real In Indochina today. It 
finds expression in the nationalism ~hat 
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i~ now surging through the area. In 
my repOrt to the Poretgn Relations Com-
mltt<-E: last October, I said: 
'!'he probltm tor :t•rnnce and. In an Indirect 
..,ru:c, for ounelvee, to to treat with thl$ 
po!ltl~:>l r~llty Jof natlonnllsrnl In a man-
ncr which wllllnsure that full Independence, 
one" l\Chlevtd, wlll not lmmrdlntely be nul-
lified In the onrwh of tnternatlonl\1 com-
munism. It Ia a problem that hNI both 
morl\1 and practical nspectl. This country 
ls committed by bellt•f, tradition. and prac-
tlcn to pollclrs of supporting the right to 
sclf·£O'crnm•nt of J~Ople able and •llllng 
to u.ume the reopon£ll>llltl~ of sel! ·govern-
ment. Mural nspec\6 apart, fl\llure to utlllzo 
the lndiEenous powt'r Inherent In natlonal-
i$JI1 ntt'rely IN\es to tnrren.&e 1mmeaaurably 
the <"OSt to ourachcs Rnd to Franet- of pre-
veutnlg tb(• Communtetr. from selztng Indo .. 
chlnu and It could even throw the entire 
lso;ue Into doubt. 
The failure ~o far to rcnch agreement 
ln Paris on the terms of run indrpcnd-
encc iS a fuilure to understand fully the 
pOwer of uation.'\ll~m in this stru"rle 
aramst communi~m. It results, In ef-
fect. in the need for greater sacntlces 
of French manpower and creatcr aid 
ftom the United States. It Is, however, 
only a part of the politicul failure. In 
the same rrport last October, I al~o said: 
The polltiCl\1 pr• bltms of the Associated 
StMts will not end with the achle•ement 
of full Independence. • • • 'l'he basic prOb· 
Jcm which confronts all thrtt governments 
And particularly that of Vlttnnm Is to put 
down firm rooi.S In their uspecuve popu· 
lations. Tht·y will be nble to do so only l! 
th<y evolve In accord with populnr senti· 
ment and If they deal compttently with 
such basic probleiNl as I! literacy. public 
health. exceulve population In the deltas, 
lnequtt!es In lnbor nnd land tenure. and 
vlllage and a.~rlcult.ural lmpro' ement. 
l'lnnl!y, It lo cuentlal that there be a eon-
atnot raising of tht ethlcl\1 standards of 
government and a determination to \I&C the 
arml,.s. now tn U1c )>roc~sa or torm••tlon. 
et.rlctty for national rather than prlvo.te pur-
posea. Failure In theoe fund:>mentnl re-
sponolbllltlcu of self-government wlll result 
In the achievement or the shadow rather 
than the aubetance of Independence. 
It ls generally ncknowlcdged, I am 
sorry to say, that there has been fnllure 
in this re>pect on the part of some of 
the Indochmcse Nationalht leaders. It 
would not be appropriate for me to dis-
cuss the personalities in other govern-
ments. Yet. competent ob.<ervers in 
Indochina, have pOinted repeatedly to 
the mistrust of the people or Indochina 
for some or the National!st leaders. 
There is apparently considerable feeling 
that they do not represent the aspira-
ttons of the ordmary people and that 
they are concerned not with the prob-
lrm.s of the ordinary people but only 
With their own welfare, protlt, and pleas-
ure. Some have nlso slipped into a pat-
tern of petty factionalism, which in the 
end may dcstroy them. 
H 1 may be blunt, I do not believe that 
the Nationnlists have seriously begun to 
undercut the strenrth of the Communist 
movement bccau~c they have not yet se-
rtously begun to 1·espond to the needs of 
their people. 
I hnve ~puken of the political failure of 
the French nnd o! the Indochinese lead-
ers. I speak now of our own. The Chief 
of Stafr or our Armed Forces, 5peaking 
In Washington on March 22, Is quoted a.s 
.stating that "the French are going to 
wm. It Is a ft~ht that Is going to be fin-
Ished wtth our help." If this Is a correct 
quot.at•on. then I am compelled to ask, 
What about the Indochinese people? Is 
this simply a war which concerns us and 
the French, and In which the people 
whose country is beinc four:ht over nre 
relegated to the sideline~? Jf there are 
too many inappropriate statements like 
this one, the Indochlnc•e wtll, lndred, 
rrmam on the ~idehnt' and l!'nve the 
stru!<r.le to us. If they do so. the enti1 e 
moral justification of ow· participation 
will collapse. 
We have siven our military aid un-
stintincly in Indochina. We have sent 
our technicians. But we have not yet 
spoken clearly and succinctly of our J>O-
lttJcal obJecllvc:. in thi' area. Secretary 
Dulles has said that we would prev<>nt 
Indochina from falling to thr Commu-
r..sts by united action. United action of 
whom? Of the Wes!Rrn Power, alone? 
Does the term "united action" include 
Asian nations as well? Does it include 
at least the Indochine'e people? If it 
does. it seems that their representatives 
might have been invited to attend the 
Geneva Conference. Such vague terml-
nolopy can only serve to confuse the 
Issue in Indochina and the cfl'ot·t which 
ls beiM made to keep the reflton out of 
the hands of Communist tyranny. 
The administration has never yet 
made clear in uneqmvocal terms, more-
over, "hether or not this country seeks 
the full independence of the three As.~o­
ciated States. It has hinted at this as 
our policy. It has inferred this as our 
policy. But It has never stated In clear-
cut lancua~;e thnt thi.• Is our pOlicy. 
I was much tmpres.,td by the remarks 
of the Senator from Massachusetts [Mt·. 
KENNEDY J who said in his admirable 
speech on this subj~t a few days aeo: 
The time to study. to doubt, to review, and 
revtse • • • 1s now. 
Thls I~ the thought. which has moved 
me to speak today. li have reviewed what 
I believe to be the failures which have 
led us and other free nations to the im-
pas$e at which we now find ourselves. 
Only a few days remnln before the Ge-
neva Conference. 1f we go into that 
Conferrnce wtthout chnnge in the pres-
ent state of atfalrs, the most we can hope 
for is a pOstponement of the crisis which 
sooner or later must be faced. At worst, 
we can expect an unmitigated disaster. 
Out of this Conference may come a. truce. 
which will insure ultimate communist 
control or Indochina with all that im-
plies for our own seeunty and the secu-
rity or other free nations. 
Out of this conference may come a 
major upheaval in the Internal pOlitical 
structure of France. Out of this con-
ference may come the collap$e of all 
plans for the united defense o! Western 
EuropP. Out of thi~ conference mny 
come, m the L'l't analysis, world war III. 
There may still be a chance before the 
Geneva meetinf! for the free nations to 
~tand up succt'SSfully In this crl~is. 
They must make cle~•r once and for all 
what this strof!gle in Indochina means. 
They must demonstrate that they are 
engaged In a truly "united action," not 
on behalf of a single nation or group of 
nations, but on behalf of freedom . 
What Is needed now ls nction along 
the following lines: 
First. Declaration by the French that 
their sole purpOse In Indochina Is to 
secure the full national independence of 
the three states of Vietnam, Cambodia, 
and Laos: 
Second. Endorsement or this declara-
tion by the United States and other free 
nallons: 
Third. R!'sumptlon of ne"otiations In 
Paris or Salf(on to set a date for the full 
independence or all three of the asso-
Ciated state~: 
Fourth. Establishment or the machin-
ery tor the progressive transfer of full 
sovereignty to the three states, including 
opt1onal arrangements to permit the 
Indochine"c to remain In the French 
Unoln only It they so elect: 
Fifth. Appointment of three srparate 
United States Ambn.<Sadors or Ministers 
to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos; 
Sixth. Con venin!( of constituent pOliti-
cal assemblies In the three Indochinese 
States wit.h a view to reorganizing their 
governments on the basiS of more J>OPU-
Jar representation; 
Seventh. Relinquishment of French 
cimenship by all national!st leaders now 
holding such citizenship. 
Action along these lines does not con-
stitute a panacea for the situation in 
Indochina. It docs not guarantee a. 
cheap, an easy, or a quick way out of the 
morass. Totalitarian commumsm Is 
strom• in Asia and will not yield ca.~ily to 
the forces of freedom. Action nlong 
these lines. however, can prevent the 
Geneva Conference from ending in dis-
aster. It can clarify the obJectives of 
the struggle in Indochina. It can lay 
the groundwork for a legitimate and re-
spOnstble consideration of the situation 
by the United Nations. 
This may be the last chance ln Indo· 
china. The time to take It iS now. 
Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. Mr. 
President, will the Senator from Mon-
tana yield? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. 
Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. I com-
mend the Senator from Montana for his 
very frank statem~>nt and for the mod-
erate pOSition he takes. I should like to 
ask him one question. 
Jn the Geneva. Conference do we not 
face two grave danger.;? SupJlOiiC the 
Soviets and the Indochine~c Communists 
advocate the steps which the Senator 
hlm.~elf has propOSed as being wt~e for 
us to take today, and they are acted upon 
favorably. Does that not drive the 
Indochinese Nationalists and all the 
other grouPS In Indochina Into the hands 
of the Communl.st.~? would they not 
then regard the Communists as their 
close friends? Is that not one of the 
grave danr.ers? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I am ~re the Sen-
ator from Colorado is correct. If there 
should be a negotiated truce or tettle-
ment, I do not see how anyone but the 
Communists could win, no matter how 
1t looks at the present time. 
Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. Doe8 not 
that make lt all-impOrtant that our po-
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sltlon be completely clarified prior to the 
opening of the Geneva Conference? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I could not possi-
bly agree more than I do v.-lth the sena-
tor's statement. 
li:-.:ITED S't.\TES PJtOT'&CI'S AND DDI"L""''DS COLONIAL 
SLAVERY 
1\Ir. MALONE. Mr. President, will 
the Senator from Montana yield? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. 
Mr. MALONE. First, I should like 
to congratulate the Senator on bringing 
the subject before the Senate. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I am not the tl.rst 
one to bring it before the Senate. 
Mr. MALONE. Following the state-
ment of the senator from Massachusetts 
1 :\fr. KENNEDY I of a few days aqo. I 
should like to ask the Senator this 
question: What would be our position 
In Indochina if we send our troops there 
nnd 1t resulted In an all-out war? How 
long could our troops remain there? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Once a decision 
has been made, it Is up to us all, regard-
less of party, to support the decision. If 
we become Involved In Indochina, there 
Is a 50-50 chance, In my opinion, that 
ned China will become Involved In Indo-
china. too. and that also Red China will 
once again reopen the Korean struggle. 
Then we shall be on the mainland of 
Asia. whether we like It or not, and the 
net result may well be tl:at we may not 
only be engaged In a war for a long. long 
t1me. but in the meantime, «.>vcn West-
ern Europe. Its industrial potential as 
well as its people, will fall prey to Com-
munist aggression. 
Mr. MALONE. There Is no doubt. I 
suppose. in anyone's mind that Red 
China Is behind the war In Indochina at 
this time. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. None at all. 
Mr. MALONE. If Russia should offi-
cially enter the conflict. and we should 
send our men to Indochina. as we sent 
them to Korea, even If we were winning, 
how long does the Senator think we 
could keep our men on the Asian main-
land? 
M1·. ::I.!ANSFIELD. I would not know 
how long: no one can an~wer that ques-
tion. I will say to the senator. 
Mr. MALONE. I should !Ike to say 
to the distinguiShed Senator that many 
m111tary strategists think we could not 
t·ven get our men out or Indochina. 
We could neither feed them nor get 
them out. They would be prisoner:;, 
dead. or on the way to the salt mines 
In a relatively short time. 
Mr. 1\!A.NSFIELD. At the present 
t1me it would be a physical Impassibility 
for the French to withdraw from Indo-
china. becau~ the roads from Hanoi 
con5ist of one rail line and one highway. 
We could not get troops away !rom 
there. because we could not get suf-
ficient means to transport them. That 
Is one of the chances we take and why 
It Is impassible at the present ume for 
the French to withdraw. 
Mr. MALONE. It 1:;, of course, an 
Impassibility. If an all-out war should 
start, our boys would be either prl:;oners 
of war or be cut to pieces. 
I should also like to ask the Senator 
from Montana this question: Have there 
been any Indications that the French are 
fighting for anything except to hold a 
colonial pos~sston? If there should be 
an aU-out war, and we should fight and 
finally win, France would expect to get 
back its colonial posse:s;lons, just as 
England went back Into the Malayan 
Stat~s after World War II. Is there 
any Indication thn t l~rance wishes to 
free Indochina? Or docs she wish to 
hold it as a colonial nation. with low 
wage and living standards so that there 
is a profit to the French? 
l\1r. MANSFIELD. In my opinion, 
there are indication!; that France wants 
to give up Its colonial control of Indo-
china. and wants to pull out or that area. 
The only thmg It would not like would 
be the retention within the French Union 
of the three Indochinese states. I think 
the war Is costing the French so much, 
in addition to what we have put into 
It, that they are sicl: and tired of it. 
AU they can see Is the continued loss of 
men and money. I am convinced in my 
own mind that, on the ba:;ls of the July 
3 statement by France, she wnnts to give 
these little nntlons their independence, 
but she seems to be afraid to take the 
final step which wlll guarantee victory 
tor them In their tlght for the Inde-
pendence of their own countries. 
Mr. MALONE. I und«.>rstand the Sen-
ator was In Saigon during the past year. 
Mr. MANSFIElD. I was there !or a 
couple of weeks. 
l\1r. MALONE. I was there In 1948. I 
took occasion to go review a part of the 
area, and I saw many of the Nationalists. 
We have every reason to believe that the 
situation has not materially changed. 
We are givmg them. just as we are giving 
every other colonial nation throughout 
the world, the choice of communism or a 
continuation of their colonial status. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. It Is a choice be-
tween communism and freedom. 
Mr. MALONE. That Is not evident. I 
ask the distinguished Senator If he can 
refer us to any document Indicating that 
the French are offering them freedom. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I pointed out in my 
speech the fact that an agreement has 
been reached betwe«.>n them and the Re-
public of France. According to Informa-
tion coming from respOnsible Cambo-
dians, they are about 80 percent along 
the way toward an agreement. Negotia-
tions are in progress, and duties have 
been turned over to them which for~erly 
were performed by the French. 
Mr. MALONE. I know of no agree-
ment at this time. and there Is none in 
prospect, except one which would hold 
Indochina as some kind of a satellite 
nation, contlnutn~: to contribute to the 
support of the French nation. 
Mr. :MANSFIELD. No: I would not use 
that term. I believe the French will give 
them full Independence. It they want to 
come back into the French Union, that 
is their responsibility. 
Mr. MALONE. Is there any a!lreement 
that It they do not want to remain in the 
French Union they do not have to do so? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Not at the present 
time. I should not be sm-prlsed If such 
an agreement is being serious consid-
ered. 
Mr. MALONE. It takes more to sur-
prise the Senator than It docs to surprise 
me. I f'hould be very much surprisod tc 
they are otrered anything except some 
kind of n deal which would result In 
France continuing to receive an income 
from Indochina. 
When the Atlantic Pact was signed I 
said on this Sem\te floor In debate. '"What 
we are dolnl{ Is guaranteeing the intet::-
rity of the colonial system throughout 
the world." That was denied. But we 
were agreeing to go to war when the 
empire-minded nations. England, France, 
Netherlands. and Belgium were In war. 
we have no control over their actions and 
they would go to war to protect theh· 
colonial systems. In protecting their 
colonial systems they claim they are 
fighting communism. 
The colonial nations never have been 
given a choice to become entirely inde-
pendent. We have not said that they 
should have Independence. Did I not 
underst:md the Stnator to say that we 
as a nation had not made our position 
clear? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is en-
titled to his own opinion, but so far as 
the NATO agreement Is concemed, It 
does not apply to colonial areas· it ap-
plies to the home countries. ' 
Mr. MALONE. Mr. President, will the 
Senator from Montana yield for a ques-
tion? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield tor a ques-
tion. 
Mr. MALONE. Has the Senator heard 
of any of those areas Into which we have 
gone to protect t-Ither England. Belgium, 
or France that have received any free-
dom from their colonial status? Have 
they not sent troops In to protect theh· 
possessions? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I know of no In· 
terventlon In the Belgian Congo or In 
Malaya or any other place---
Mr. MALONE. There was a war In 
Malaya. We conquered the Japanc..>e 
people anct the English moved back in 
and are continuing the same colonial 
domination-continuing to dominate the 
production and trade just the same as 
France has done In Indochina !or 100 
years. 
Is it not time that we define our ob-
jective~? 
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I wish 
to commend my distinguished colleague 
from Montana for the very tine contri-
bution he has made here today. This 
is not the first contribution he has made 
in connection with a thorough, adequate 
discussion of conditions in Indochina. 
I desire to say to my distinguished 
colleague that It seems to me that all thl~ 
discussion points up the necessity of 
the administration. through the Presi-
dent of the United States, coming to 
Congress and defining not only the Im-
mediate problems, but also the long-
range problems, which confront us in 
Indochina. 
The distinguished Senator from Mon-
tana has pointed out very effectively to-
day the Immediate needs and also the 
long-range requirements with which we 
are confronted. I think the Senate as a 
body will stand behind the President 
of the United States. It Is difficult, how-
ever, to know where we are to stand it we 
do not know what t~e policy is. 
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I wish to take the opportunity once 
again to commend the Senator upon his 
distinguished contribution and upon his 
effort to try to solve this critical prob-
lem. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Sen-
ator !rom Washington. 
Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the 
Senator yield? 
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. 
MARTIN in the chair). Does the Sen-
ator from Montana yield to the Senator 
from Tennessee? 
l".U. MANSFIELD. I yield, provided I 
do not lose my right to the fioor. 
Mr. GORE. I have followed very 
closely the provocative and able address 
delivered by the junior Senator from 
Montana. I underscored two sentences 
of the Senator's speech, in order that I 
might later make inquiry of him with 
respect thereto. I read from his speech, 
as follows: 
U Is clear, now. that the administration 
believes our strategic stake In Indochina Is 
very great. 
I wish to say to the able Senator from 
Montana that I certainly agree with him 
that for us the stakes are great. 
The next sentence I v.•ish to read is 
this: 
It Is also clear that we have been com-
mitted very deeply In Indochina, probably 
even to tile extent o! military action by 
American !orccs. 
By what process does the able Senator 
from Montana think we have been com-
mitted thus deeply? 
Mx. MANSFIELD. I may say to the 
Senator from Tennessee that the only 
information I get is what I read in the 
newspapers or what I happen to hear. 
What I am about to say not only ap-
peared in a column in yesterday's news-
paper but I heard it a week or so ago, 
and it was to the effect that the leader-
ship of the Senate and the House, and 
the ranking members of the Committees 
on Al·med Services. had met with Mr. 
Dulles and Admiral Radford. and that at 
one of the meetings two possibilities were 
raised. 
The first was the possibility known as 
limited action, which supposedly had to 
do with sending planes from carriers in 
the region of Indochina. 
The other possibility was the adoption 
of a resolution authorizing the President 
of the United States to take such action 
as might be necessary. 
The first of these limited actions, of 
course, if what I heard was true, would 
mean our actual involvement. 
People can talk all they wish about our 
air support and air strikes, but any time 
such action is taken, it will not be long 
before the foot soldier will have to move 
in. 
So far as the resolution possibility is 
concerned, if there was such a proposal, 
I think that if such a resolution should 
be agreed to. it would mean the abdica-
tion of responsibility by Convress, ~md 
I should be very much opposed to it. I 
think Congress ought to be informed, 
and informed minutely, of events as they 
are developing. 
Mr. GORE. Is the Senator from Mon-
tana in a position to be more explicit 
about the resolution to which he has 
made reference? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. No; I have just 
heard rumors about it. I could not give 
a::1y definite information about it. I 
know, for example, that it appeared in a. 
newspaper column in the Washington 
Post and Times Herald of yesterday, but 
I have no reference to the column which 
mentioned it. I picked up the informa-
tion about 4 or 5 days or a week ago. 
I do not know whether it is true or false. 
That is why I have called it a rumor. 
Mr. GORE. I hope the Senator from 
Montana realizes that when I submit 
ihe~e inquiries, I do not wish to appear 
unduly critical either of him or of the 
administration at this critical time. I 
should like to know if the able Senator 
from Montana considers that when the 
President of the United States makes a 
public statement. public to the world, 
that the United States cannot afford to 
permit Communist domination of the 
Indochina Peninsula, the integrity of the 
United States of America is put at stake 
before the eyes of the world. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is 
correct. I should say in reply that there 
are various ways in which the assertion 
by the President could perhaps be an-
swered. 
Mr. GORE. If we, the United States, 
are committed so deeply as the able 
junior Senator from Montana seems to 
think that we are, does he not believe 
it is time for the administration to re-
consider the 30-percent reduction In the 
budget for the United States Army? If, 
indeed, we are teetering on the brink of 
another war, is now the time to make 
drastic reductions In the size of the 
United States Army and Marine Corps, 
and to "mothball'' ships of our Navy? 
Just how does the so-called New Look 
policy fit into the more recently an-
nounced policies of President Eisen-
hower and Secretary Dulles? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. As the Senator 
knows. if it comes to more extensive 
commitments, there will be no New Look, 
as such; although really I do not know 
what the New Look .is. It has the ear-
marks of things which happened dur-
ing the time when Louis Johnson was 
Secretary of Defense, and the Nation was 
said to have had so much strength that, 
as a result, If anyone had attacked us 
at 4:45 in the morning, we would have 
been able to wipe them otf the face of 
the globe by 5 o'clock in the afternoon. 
That did not work out, but I am quite 
certain the administration at present 
must be reappraising the situation, both 
from a political and a military stand-
point, so that in the event of an emer-
gency they will be able to revise the 
figures which have been given to Con-
gress to date. 
Mr. GORE. I should hope that that 
would be the case. Certainly, if the 
United States faces imminent danger, 
as I believe it does, then this is not the 
time to make drastic reductions in oux 
national defense. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I agree with the 
Senator from Tennessee. 
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will 
the Senator yield? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. 
Mr HUMFHREY. First, I wish to join 
with other Senators who have already 
been engaged in colloquy with the dis-
tinguished Senator from Montana, in 
commendation for his very statesman-
like address: Indeed, one which poses 
the whole problem, both political and 
military, as it pertains to Indochina and 
our relationships to this area. 
I hold in my hand a copy of the Sen-
ator's address. On page 18 I notice 
with considerable interest the Senator's 
comments concerning the military 
strength of the opposing forces in Indo-
china. Therefore. I wish to ask the Sen-
ator 1 or 2 questions. 
Is it not true that the forces of the 
Associated States and the French Union 
in the Indochina area arc far superior 
in manpower to the communist forces 
of the Viet Minh, as the Senator has 
noted in his address? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. They are supericr, 
not only in manpower, but in war mate-
riel as well. 
I would be willing to make the asser-
tion that no general in all the history 
of France has had at his disposal the 
amount of material which General Na-
van·e has at his disposal today. 
Mr. HUMPHREY. The point I wished 
to have the Senator from Montana de-
velop was that there is not only a ratio 
of about 5 to 3 in manpower; namely, 
more than 500,000 men in the forces of 
the Associated States and the French 
Union, as compared with 300,000 for the 
Communist Viet Minh forces; but also 
that the Associated States and French 
Union forces have much better equip-
ment, and in larger quantities, by far, 
than do the Communist forces. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator from 
Minnesota is correct. As I understand, 
5,000 tons of supplies a month arc com-
ing from China over the border into 
Indochina, to assist the Communist-led 
Viet Minh. I understand that the total 
amount of supplies, Including American 
aid, being shipped to the forces of the 
Associated States Union is in the vicinity 
of 50,000 tons a month, indicating, in 
contrast to the 5-to-3 proportion, so 
far as combat etrectives are concerned, a 
ratio of 10 to one so far as war materiel 
is concerned. 
Mr. HUMPHREY. Is it not true that 
the communist forces are without naval 
power 
Mr. MANSFIELD. They have none at 
all. 
Mr. HUMPHREY. They have little or 
no airpower? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. They have none. 
Mr. HUMPHREY. And the French 
have a substantial fleet, or at least naval 
forces in the area, and a very substantial 
air force, have they not? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. That is conect. 
Mr. HUMPHREY. The pw·pose of my 
questions is to point out that. as I see 
it, there is a great deal of manpower in 
the area, organized into combat or oper-
ational units. In other words, there are 
significant numbers of organized man-
power; secondly, there is an organized 
navy and air force on the part of the 
Associated States and the French Union. 
I ask these questions only to detail fur-
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ther the documentation of the remarks 
or the Senator from Montar.a. The cen-
tral problem the Senator has mentioned 
and touched and elaborated on Is the 
political problem or the psychological 
problem. is it not? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. That Is correct. 
Mr. HUMPHREY. It Is In dealing with 
that problem, as stated by the senator 
from Montana, that the Senator believes 
we have been less effective, Is It not? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct. 
Mr. HUMPHREY. I notice the sen-
ator from Montana said, In the earlier 
part of his address. speaking now of the 
problems which pertain both to the mili-
tary and political questions In Indochina, 
that It Is not clear that these conditions 
are even understood by the administra-
tion. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. That Is correct. 
Mr. HUMPHREY. Does the Senator 
recall li~tenlng to Admiral Radford and 
other officials of our Government point-
Ing out the effective parts of the Na-
varre plan as It pertains to m1lltary 
opemtlons? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I do. 
Mr. HUMPHREY. Without going Into 
any of the details, which were explained 
to us In executive session. does the Sena-
tor really believe that the Navarre plan 
can be successful as a military plan un-
lcs.~ the political considerations the Sena-
tor from Montana has outlined In his 
address are fulfilled? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Neither the Na-
varre plan, the Dulles plan. nor any 
other plan. Is going to be fulfilled unless 
two COJldltlons are met, In Vietnam 
principally, but throughout the Associ-
ated States as well. First, there must 
be competent. respected leadership. The 
second Is what I call, from my Marine 
Corps expetience, an esprit de corps 
among the Vietnamese Army and the 
Vietnamese population. It Is essential 
that those people believe In themselves 
nnd In their own liberty and Independ-
ence. It they do, with the right kind of 
leadership they will win without any 
troops or any other help being sent. 
They are fightln~~: their brothers. but 
their brothers fight with some determi-
nation. and the Vietnamese lack such de-
termination. There ls no reason why, 
given independence, given the right to 
decide theil· own leadership, they could 
not win. because once that Is assured, 
It will be found that a great proportion 
of the Vietnamese population will get off 
the fence and on the right side. 
Mr. HUMPHREY. It Is true, Is It not, 
that the real weakness has bE·en, first, 
thl' uncertainty as to the meaning or the 
French political declaration and the fol-
low throu~:h? 
Mr. ~IANSFIELD. That Is correct. 
Mt·. HUl\1PHREY. Secondly, the 
weakness has been the lack of decisive 
leudership, particularly on the part of 
Bao Dtu in Vietnam, and, of course. In 
the other Associated States. and the fail-
ure or the United States Government, In 
its aid program, which, by the way, 
nmounts to over $1 billion a year. to 
mnke it clear to the Indochinese that 
this military help Is not for the purpose 
of assisting French colonialism or any-
body else's colonialism, but !or the pur-
pose which the Senator from Montana 
has stated. to raise the .standard of free-
dom. grant free choice to the Associated 
States to be either In the Prench union 
or out of the French union. and to be 
tree and Independent. Would not the 
Senator say those nrc the areas of weak-
ness and Indecisiveness'? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator has 
made a correct statement. The element 
or leadership is needed. It Is necessary 
that those people believe ln their own 
freedom, and demonstrate an ability and 
will fight for it. The ultimate answer 
Is not going to be found in French forces 
and American aid; it Is going to be found 
In the will and determination of the 
Vietname:;e. They will either win or lose 
their own freedom , regardless of what 
we may do. 
Mr. HUMPHREY. Will any of the 
natives of Indochina ever believe that 
there Is sincerity in the o«er of freedom 
and Independence so long as there Is In 
existence a military trnlnlng program. 
for example, which excludes natives of 
Indochina from officer rank, and does 
not permit them to build up a noncom-
missioned officer corps nnd obtain lead-
ership ln a military sense? Is It not true 
that the French insist on holding to a 
military program which excludes native 
trooPS from all positions of command? 
Mr. Z...1ANSFIELD. That Is partially 
correct. I understand there Is a new 
French training command to which at 
the present time two American officers 
have been attached. and that the com-
mander will proceed to Include natives 
In such training. I also understand, 
from reading the newspapers about a 
week ago, that the ChiE'f of Stnte. Bao 
Dal, and the Vietnamese Chief of Staff, 
General Hinh. attended the graduation 
ceremonies at the military academy at 
Dalat, at which some 600 platoon lead-
ers, captaius, and majors, were grad-
uated. 
So. if I may, I should like to say to 
say to the Senator from Minnesota that 
In that respect it seems that something 
Is being done to relieve the difilculty the 
Senator has mentioned. 
Mr. HUMPHREY. A very belated 
effort. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. True. but better 
late than never. In point of time. 
Mr. HUMPHREY. Would lt not seem 
important and desirable In the prelim-
Inary negotiations being conducted prior 
to the Geneva Conference, that the Sec-
retary of state. Mr. Dulles, have it pretty 
clear in his mind that the Senate of the 
United States-or at least a substantial 
number of the Member::. of the Senate-
favors and SUPPOrts freedom and inde-
pendence for the Associated States of 
Indochina and the right of those people 
to determine their own future? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes, that Is true; 
and I would venture to assume that he 
does know it and that he is perhaPS 
working along that line. 
Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator from 
Montana has always been a very con-
structive and helpful member or the Gov-
ernment of the United States. I hope 
our Secretary of State docs know the 
feelings of the Senate; but I must say to 
the junior Senator f rom ... 1ontana that 
Jn some private conversations I have had, 
even as of this date, with resPOnsible of-
fleers of the Government, I am not at all 
convinced that the position of our Gov-
ernment Is one of complete freedom and 
Independence for Indochina. 
I am of the opinion that our Govern~ 
ment, while It has not officially declared 
Its position, has back In the recesses of 
its official mind, the attitude that Indo~ 
china may not be quite ready for inde-
pendl.'nce. and that it may take a ion~ 
time for the people of Indochina to bt• 
ready for Independence. My comment Is 
that whether they are ready or not, they 
should be given it. They are not going to 
have their Independence until somebody 
guarantees It to them. It we are going to 
be spending American money and usln~ 
American material. plus getting close to 
further Involvement in Indochina, we 
ought to back what we do with our word 
for independence. 
I am disturbed over what the Senatot• 
has stated and over what other Members 
of this body have said about a lack of 
clarity on the part of our hlgh military 
and State Department officials In makinr:-
lt clear that this country does stand for 
independence and for complete freedom 
of these states. One cannot play both 
sides of the street on this question. We 
cannot tamper with the question: we 
have to be definite about lt. It the Sena-
tor from Montana has any information 
which he can give to the senate that the 
position of our Government Is !or un-
equivocal Independence, the Members of 
the Senate should know it. It the sena-
tor has such Information, I wish he 
would state it. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I am unable to give 
the Senator the assurance he has re-
quested along that line, and I know of 
his great Interest In that aspect of the 
subject: but I wish to express the opin-
Ion that Mr. Dulles, the Secretary of 
State, has undoubtedly been reading or 
hearing about speeches made by the Sen-
ator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY I, 
and the statements and speeches made 
by the majority leader, which all indicate 
an interest In the freedom of the Associ-
ated States of Indochina. I am quite sure 
Mr. Dulles Is enough of a Secretary or 
State, enough of a statesman, and enough 
of a graduate of this deliberative body 
to be fully aware of what is going on; and 
I would assume he would be acting ac-
cordingly. 
When Mr. Dulles returns, I assuml' 
that at some time he will appear be!on· 
our committee: and then we shall havt.> 
a chance to ask him questions and to 
have his position set down In black and 
white, Instead of basing it upon assump-
tions which seem to differ insofar as the 
senator from Minnesota and myself are 
concerned. 
Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes. Let me ~ay 
I am not beln~ critical of the Secretary 
of State. I think too many of our Sec-
retaries of Stnte have been harassed al-
most beyond human endurance. 
When the Democratic administration 
was In power. the Government of the 
United States dragged its feet for months 
on the question of Independence !or In-
donesia, and there still remain in the 
State D·~partment a group who believo 
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the Dutch should have sovereignty over 
Indonesia. In Indonesia we arc still 
paying for that situation, despite the 
fact that the President of that Republic, 
Dr. SOekarno, Is friendly to the United 
States. 
In the midst of the last war, despite 
our being an ally of Great Britain and 
despite the fact that Churchlll said he 
would not preside over the liquidation 
of the British Empire, the Government 
or the United States made it unequivo-
cally clear that the United States was in 
favor of independence for India, Mr. 
Churchill notwithstanding. 
So I think It is about time that we 
reinind a few other people that we are 
In favor of their independence. The 
French and the British may not like it; 
but the American people will not like it, 
either. unless we watch out very care-
fully what we do and make our position 
definite and certain. 
I wish to commend the Senator from 
Montana for his basic recommendations, 
which, Indeed, are sound and compre-
hensive in scope, and offer a pro~:ram of 
action. We are greatly Indebted to him. 
I believe we must also be careful to 
make sure that we continue to carry on 
the tradition of freedom of our country. 
We were the first to recognize the inde-
pendence of the State of Israel; It did 
not take us long to do so. We finally 
recognized the Independence of the Re-
public of Indonesia, and we called for 
the Independence of India. We were 
the first to call for the independence of 
the Latin American Republics from the 
powers of the Old World. 
In the case or Indochina we have been 
engaging in slow motion. It Is about 
time we made our political position clear. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Sena-
tor from Minnesota. 
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will 
the Senator from Montana yield to me, 
for a question? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. 
Mr. STENNIS. Let me preface my 
question by quoting one sentence from 
the speech the Senator from Montana 
bas made: 
It will ~ too Ia te. In short, to keep Indo-
china from fnlllng or slipping Into the net of 
Communist totalitarianism, or. perbap•. this 
country from an ~qually dlsa.strou• full-scale 
military Involvement In the confl1ct. 
Mr. President, from the experience of 
the Senator from Montana as a Mem-
ber of Congres.o;. and presently as a. 
member of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, and from what I know about his 
Intense personal interest In this subject, 
I think he speaks on it with knowledge 
and authority, and I know he speaks with 
sincerity. From that sentence In his 
speech I judge that he thinks we are 
approaching a state of facts that could 
involve us in a full-scale military in-
volvement in this confliCt. In that con-
nection I wish to ask him a question. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Let me say to the 
Senator from Mississippi that I think 
we are approaching a conference preg-
nant with possibilities. 
Mr. STENNIS. Yes. 
Based on the background I have just 
recited. let me ask a question, without 
being in the least critical of Mr. Dulles, 
and in particular I do not w~h to embar-
rass him on the eve of the Geneva Con-
ference. But at the same time, does the 
Senator from Montana feel that the peo-
ple of the United States, and especially 
the Members of Congress. arc being pre-
pared by being given sufficient facts as 
a. basis for their thinking and to enable 
them to obtain a grasp of the situation, 
so as to be able to m('et such a suggestion 
as the one described by the Senator from 
Montana In the sentence I have just 
Quoted from his speech. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. So far as Congres.o; 
is concerned. I think there is a great deal 
more knowledge of the situation than Is 
the case throughout the Nation as a 
whole. Of course that is understand-
able, because some of us have been in-
terested for some time in Indochina, 
and others of us are kept In fairly con-
stant touch with conditions and events 
there. But throughout. the country \VC 
find that the people generally do not 
understand the potentials In connection 
with this struggle. and I am afraid a 
good many of them do not understand 
what our contribution has been or what 
Its possible effect upon us may be. 
Mr. STENNIS. Yes. I feel that the 
people generally have not been suffi-
ciently Informed. and that there is a 
strong sentiment against our taking any 
steps in the conflict. unless more Is 
known about what we are going into and 
what the possibilities are as we go into 
it, and about the need for Intervention 
by us. as well as the need for interven-
tion by the other nations of the free 
world. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct. 
Mr. STEm"'s. I think more state-
ments on this very subject should come 
from the administration side of the aisle. 
In my opinion, the best statement that 
has been made on it was the impromptu 
one. made about a week ago by the Sen-
ator from California [Mr. KNowx.ANDI, 
the majority leader, when he said that 
whatever we did toward going into Indo-
china, he wanted It understood that. 
there would have to be more than token 
assistance. that there would have to be 
a bona fide contribution, and that it 
would have to· be understood from the 
beginning that a bona fide effort would 
be made to carry It out. 
Those are also my sentiments, Mr. 
President. 
As the basis for another question, I 
should like to quote a sentence from a 
paragraph In the text of the United 
States-British statement. as carried by 
the Associated Press under date of 
Aprill3: 
Accordingly. v:e arc ready to take part \\Cith 
the otber countries principally concerned In 
an examination oC the posslblllty ot estnb-
Jisblng a collective defen><'. within the 
framework or the Charter or the United Na-
tions Organization. to assure t.he peace. se-
curity. and freedom of southeast Asia and 
the western Paclflc. 
Mr. President. let me say that I am 
glad to see, as the basis for that state-
ment, that a united effort will really 
mean an effort on the part of the other 
free nations, and that we are not going 
to act alone or be expected to act alone, 
or to carry more than our fair share 
of the burden. I think that is the pri-
mary point l."l which the people of the 
United States arc interested, as they at-
tempt to obtam the facts. I commend 
Mr. Dulles for making bls statement and 
taking that position, so as to have a clear 
understanding now of the basis on which 
we may proceed. 
I shall be glad to have the Senator 
from Montana comment on that point. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. As I understand, 
the note calls for an examination seeking 
to establish an organization, within the 
framework of the United Nations, which 
very likely would be a Pacific pact for 
southeast. Asia or a southeast pact based 
on NATO. 
Of course, Mr. President. examinations 
take a long time. Perhaps we do not 
have time to work out such an agree-
ment. 
I am glad to see that the term "united 
effort" has replaced the term "united ac-
tion," because a "united effort .. can mean 
a number of things. That Is a good step. 
To my knowledge, there have been in -
troduced, during the past 4 or 5 years, 
in both the Senate and the House or 
Representatives, bills seeking to estab-
lish a Pacific pact. But as of the pres-
ent date, nothing has been done to im-
plement those suggestions. 
Although the suggestion now made 
seems to be new, it really is not new, for 
it has received serious consideration by 
Congress, or at least by congressional 
committees, during the past 4 or 5 years. 
A crisis is required to bring it. to a head. 
The result will be that Mr. Dulles will 
come back and say, "We have won a vic-
tory. We are to have a SOutheast Asia-
Pacific Pact, or a SOutheast Asia NATO 
alliance." Let us hope it works out. It 
has been a long time coming. Personal-
ly I shall have to see more than a state-
ment signed by the Foreign Minister of 
Great Britain and Mr. Dulles before I 
will have much confidence in it. because 
I am sure that perhaps many things are 
being agreed to in principle in a hurry at 
this time in order to build up a false 
front before the Geneva conference. I 
do not happen to be from Missouri, but 
I have to be shown. Agreements that 
can be arrived at in a day or so between 
the foreign ministers of various govern-
ments ordinarily do not mean very much. 
I do not. want something to be done 
merely for the record, only to find out 
after Geneva that it. does not mean a 
thing. 
Mr. STENNIS. I certainly would not 
take an unyielding position against a so-
called Pacific pact, but I shall oppose a 
mere paper pact. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Nor would I oppose 
a Pacific pact. I have been in favor of it 
for a long time. 
Mr STENNIS. However. I think we 
ought to make It clear that it should not 
be merely a paper pact--not merely 
something that looks good on paper-
but that it must be one which represents 
all-out effort, and all-out v. illinl(ne:;s on 
the part of those most directly con-
cerned, those closest to the danger. I do 
not want the result to be that we shall 
be underwriting the entire venture our-
selves. My point is that we cannot. 
spread and extend ourselves further and 
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carry out such commitment.<. and at the 
same timP protect ourselves at home. We 
mtght as well admit that at the start. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. We have neither 
the manpower nor the resow·ces to carry 
out commitments in all parts of the 
world when anything happens. Here we 
arl'. pt>rhaps for the fourth time in 4 dec-
ades. facing a situation which may call 
upOn us to send our sons again to fight 
in n foreign land. I do not want to see 
that happen; and I believe It can bo 
avoided. I think the answer lies in de-
veloping the states of Indochina as 
wholly free. giving them a resoonsibility, 
lettln;r them decide whether they will 
remain unto themselves. or become parts 
of the French Union. France must make 
a decision in that connection. The re-
sult may well be disastrous if the right 
decision is not made. 
Before I take my seat I wish to join 
with my good friend and able colleasue, 
the Senator from Tennessee, In express-
Ing hill'h respect for the statements made 
on the Indochina situation during the 
course of the debate by the distinguished 
majority leader £Mr. KNoWLANDl, who 
has made a real contribution. He has 
been fair. He has understood all the 
implications, and I think we are ex-
tremely fortunate to have a man like 
him in the chair he occupies at a time 
like this 
Mr. President, I yield the floor 
Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I do 
not intend to enter the general debate 
this afternoon. I have listened with a. 
great <leal of interest to the able remarks 
of the Senator from Montana. On a. 
previous occasion I listened to the speech 
of the Senator from Massachusetts iMr. 
KcNNcovl. I feel that the Senat-or from 
Montana and the Senator from Massa-
chusetts have made a. contribution to 
the understanding of the Senate and the 
country with respect to this very trouble-
some problem. which is fraught with 
crave consequences in its full implica-
tions. 
However. I wish to say that I believe 
It is essential for our own Government 
and our own people, as well as for those 
with whom we have been associated in 
the free world, to take a very realistic 
viewpoint with respect to the develop-
ments which have taken place in Asia 
and the developments which are now 
ttl.king place in southeast Asia.. 
In view of the fact that the Secretary 
of State has been carrying on some tm-
oortant negotiations with Her Majesty's 
Government in London and the Govern-
ment of the French Republic in Paris, 
I would not wish to discuss at this time 
either the statement which was Issued 
jointly on behalf of Her Majesty's For~ 
elgn Secretary and the Secretary of 
State. or the developments which have 
taken place In Paris since our Secretary 
of St..'l.te has been there. 
Nor do I wish to make any statements 
which would make more difficult the 
very delicate and difficult task which 
the Secretary of State will have at the 
Geneva Conference, which is to begin on 
the 26th of April. 
However. I believe I may say.-and I 
think It is impOrtant that it be said-
Nos. 68-69--s 
that it strikes me as a little unrenllstlc, 
in the discussion of the posslblllty of a. 
rough equivalent of a. NATO pact, that 
mention was made of several countries, 
all of which are imPOrtant, and by all 
means should be Included if they desire 
to be included In such a system of col-
lective security, but that there seemed 
to be a studious elimination of the Re-
public of KOrea and the Republic of 
China on the Island of Formosa. 
The fact of the matter Is that today 
the Republic of Korea has In its armed 
forces approximately 600,000 men, who 
have been largely equipped and trained 
by tbe Government and the people of 
the United States. under the outstand-
Ing leadership, first. of General Van 
Fleet. and later of General Taylor. Not 
only is the army of the Republic of Ko-
rea recognized as the fourth largest 
standing army in the world, but perhaps 
It would compare favorably with any 
other standing army In the world today. 
To be sure. logistically that small coun-
try cannot. In and of Itself, support that 
very fine military force; but neither can 
some of our European allies, without 
logistical assistance from the United 
States. So that fact Is no discredit to 
the Republic of Korea. 
On the island of Formos..'\ the Repub-
lic of China has roughly the equivalent 
of half a million men. They have been 
trained and, to a lesser degree than In 
the case of the armed forces of Korea., 
have been equipped-pet·haps not so well 
equipped as the forces of the Republic 
of Korea, but at least they have been 
equipped, and they are now being 
equipped. That process Is being stepped 
up. We have an excellent mission there 
under General Chase. I have person-
ally had an OPPOrtunity to visit training 
camps both in Korea and In Formosa., 
and to study the condition of readiness 
of the forces, as well as the morale. I 
think they are both excellent forces. 
When we consider that those two na-
tions alone have more than 1,100,000 
men in their armed forces-perhaps at 
least 10 times as many as all the other 
nations in Asia together, including Aus-
tralia and New Zealand and the other 
nations which have been mentioned as 
possible participants In a Pacific pact--
to me it is utterly unrealistic to conceive 
that we could have an etrcctive collec-
tive security in the Pacific by counting 
the Republic of Korea and the Republic 
of China on Formosa out of the collec-
tive-security system. 
I think we must keep In mind that 
during the struggle In Koren, In which 
the first overt act of aggression took 
place since the close of World War II, 
when the United Nations Organization 
presumed to represent the desire of the 
people of the world to have a system of 
international law and order which would 
preserve the peace of the world for our-
selves and our children, and discourage 
aggression, of the 60 members of the 
United Nations. only 17 contributed a 
single soldier, sailor, or airman to the 
resistance against aggroesston in Korea., 
and all 17 of them together contributed 
less than 45,000 In armed forces. com-
pared with the contribution of this Na-
tion alone, as I mentioned the other day, 
of more than 450.000 at one time, as well 
as the rotation in and out of Korea of 
more than 1 million American troops. 
I state again that I do not believe It is an 
effective collective-security system, when 
this Nation alone, of the United Nations 
members. must bear 90 percent of the 
manpower burden, and all the other 
members of the United Nations willing to 
contribute have contributed less than 10 
percent. 
I mention It because during the Korean 
war, in 1950, after the aggression had 
taken place, and when the United Na-
tions Organization itself called UPOn the 
free nations of the world to contribute 
to the resistance or aggression In Korea, 
some or those nations were a little slow 
in coming forward with their contribu-
tions. Some of them came up very 
readily and very quickly, and we should 
appreciate the contributions which they 
made. small though they were. 
However. 4 days after the aggression 
took place the Republic of China on 
Formosa offered 35,000 of its best troops 
with which to resist the aggression in 
Korea. 
At the Insistence of a number of na-
tions. whom It Is not necessary to name 
today, that offer was turned down by 
the Government of the United States 
and by the United Nations Organization, 
even though the Republic or China. is a 
charter member or the United Nations 
Organization. I do not want to see that 
mistake repeated. 
If the time ever comes-and we all 
hope it will never come-when the chips 
are down In the Pacific, certainly it 
would not make sense that 1,100,000 
troops in the Fat· East, anti-Communist 
in character, who are determined to 
maintain themselves outside the Iron 
Curtain, should be brushed aside and 
treated almost as though they did not 
exist, while we and other naticms talk 
about a collective-security system in the 
Pacific. 
Of course, In order to be effectively 
used, their use would have to meet with 
the approval of the other governments, 
all of whom are sovereign governments. 
I am convinced, however. that if we 
should get into trouble In the Pacific or 
elsewhere. among our allies throughout 
the world, Including those in Europe, 
who are l'eliablc-and I think most of 
them are reliable, although some of 
them may not be-and others who are 
reliable, such as Greece and Turkey, who 
have given an outstanding demonstra-
tion of what they can do, with allied 
help, in resisting aggression in Korea, 
the little Republic of Korea and the 
now reduced In size Republic of China 
on Formosa would be able to render 
valuable assistance. 
Therefore, I hope that the prejudices 
of Her Majesty·s Government, whatever 
they may be, will not again be raised to 
eliminate the prompt consideration of 
the Republic of Korea and the Republic 
of China. In connection with any pact of 
the Pacific, because I have a. very deep 
conviction that I! we eliminate those 
two nations, which have more than 
1,100,000 armed troops, we will indeed 
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have In the Pacific a paper pact which 
cannot be ell'ectlve In any degree. 
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, will 
the Senator yield? 
Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield. 
Mr KENNEDY. I believe that In de-
ciding which countries should join the 
south Pacific or southeast Asia coali-
tion, we must remember that the type 
of aggression which Is going on In Indo-
chma is not comparable to that which 
occurred in Korea. 
It is very unlikely, unless the United 
Stat<'S GQvernment Intervenes actively 
In Indochina, that the Chinese Commu-
nist.; will them<elvcs Intervene with 
troops. Tile war Is alread~· colng In 
the1r favor without their overt interven-
tiOn, although they do assist the Indo-
chinese Communists to a. substantial 
decree. 
It Is far more likely that the war will 
continue to go as It has b<'cn going, 
without overt Chlne~e aggression; and 
the French will become more discouraged 
and will refuse to make the political 
concessions which would permit the 
ralsmg of an effective native army. 
'I1lerefore it seems to me that the con-
versations which are now going on with 
respect to building a system of mutual 
agreements for action In Indochina do 
not approach the heart or the problem 
at all. It is dubious-and I believe the 
Senator will agree with me-that under 
present condition.' the assistance he 
mentions will be needed in Indochina. 
What is needed far more to fight Com-
mumst aggression in Indochina is an 
effective native army to meet other na-
t •ve armies. Guarantees to come to the 
aid of Indochina if the Chinese Commu-
nist armies across the northem frontier 
are helpful, but are not the primary 
requirements as of now. 
I am concerned that. In secretary 
Dulles• desire to build up a coalition 
amon:; the Philippines, Thniland. New 
Zealand. and Australia, we may lose 
sight of the main problem, which Is the 
ra1sing of an elrective native army in 
Indochina. 
This is, of course. a most dliDcult time 
for Secretary Dulles. and I do not belie\·e 
that any debate in the Senate should 
raise questions to embarrass him in the 
days to come. However, I hope that af-
ter the Geneva Conference Is concluded, 
and after this diiDcult period Is past. we 
m the Senate shall have an opportunity 
to get a clear insight Into the nature of 
the struggle and what the attitude of 
the United States will be. 
Mr. KNOWLAND. The Senator from 
Mas.~achusetts knows, from the colloquy 
that took place on the tloor o! the Sen-
ate following h1s speech a wt-ek nco. that 
the Senator from California fully agrees 
that ell'ective resistance In the ASSOCI-
ated States will not be forthcoming un-
til the people of those states have been 
assured of their full rh.:ht to determine 
whether they will remain In the French 
Union or withdraw from lt. It may well 
be that if they were cranted Indepen-
dence today they would at a Inter date 
decide quite properly to associate them-
selves with France; but at least the 
choice must be theirs to mak<'. Until 
they can exercise such a. choice they 
will not feel that they have the freedom 
which they desire. and for which we, 
having once cut ourselves free from 
colonial ties. certainly ~hould have the 
most sympathetic feeling. 
Mr. KENNEDY. I o.m afra.id 'that 
guaranties of outside countries will have 
no appreciable effect on the struggle as 
it is presently beinp,- waped. 
Mr. KNOWLANO. I fully agree that 
there must be the wlll to resist-and this 
is true not only of southeast Asia, but is 
a fundamental consideration--and any 
government worthy of the name and any 
people worthy of preservmg their free-
dom mu~t have their heart in the de-
termination to maintain themselves out-
side the Communist Iron Curtain. 
No matter how pawcrful their friends 
abroad may be, unless people de<ire free-
dom and have the will to resist, their 
resistance will not be eltect•ve, because 
It is impassible to impart such desire and 
will from anywhere else, whether it be 
from a country In Europe or in Asia or 
in the Americas. 'I1lerc must first be 
that will to resist. When there is the 
will to resist. the other nations who wish 
to help maintain a free world of free men 
can make a contribution to the cause of 
tho~e people. 
'I1lat applies not only to southeast 
Asia, but equally to nations In Europe, 
whom I shall not name now, because it 
would serve no useful purpose to do so. 
I do know that Secretary of State 
Dulles. when he takes on the very heavy 
and burdensome duties confronting him, 
will have the good will of Congress and 
of the American people, for both recog-
nize the grave questions facing him In 
his endeavor to meet the problems which 
are to arise In the days ahead. 
PAN-AMERICAN DAY: AN ALERT 
Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I have 
listened to ~ very Informative and in-
teresting discussion of the problem of 
Indo-Asia. 
I should like to Invite the attention 
of the senate this afternoon for a few 
minutes to the fact that there is an area 
of the world where International rela-
tions are a little more plea.•ant and that 
we have a re~pansibllity to keep them so. 
Today Is Pan-American Day, a day 
which we have come to remember and 
consider as being dedicated to increased 
friendly relations among the people liv-
ing in the Western Hemisphere, includ-
ing Canada. Alaska, and the people of 
SOuth America. 
Tills year. it S<'ems to me. It Is neces-
sary more than ever to keep alive the fact 
that the friendships which we share with 
our sister American ~publics are vital, 
and that we need hemispheric solidarity 
more than we ever needed it in our na-
tional history. 
Whenever danr,crous misunderstand-
ings anse among the peoples of the 
hemisphere, whenever inter-American 
friendship is fractured. a leak is opened 
in the dike of our mutual security. Let 
us not forget that the tide beyond that 
dike Is dark and dangerous, and that it 
is a rising tide. 
I nter-American friendship, then, Is 
not merely something to applaud on Pan-
American Day, to enjoy, to accept as 
natural and right and everlasting. U 
IS something to cherish. whose growth 
we should foster and whose Increase 
must be our care. 
It is true that good will is a sturdy 
plant in the Americas. Our 21 repub-
lics share so much as heritage from a 
heroic past and as belief in a. bountiful 
future that we are likely to believe that 
friendship and cooperation for the com-
mon good can be taken for granted. 
But the hard fact is that in a world so 
swiftly subJect to change, nothing can 
safely be taken for granted. 
A government has to take thoucht In 
order to have cooperation and good wlll 
even among its o" n people. A family 
must take thought to maintain affection 
and understanding :tmong all its mem-
bers. And the American Republics, al-
thouah their friendship Is rooted in their 
histories as nations. and although their 
solidarity has held firm through the 
generations. cannot alford to neglect 
the measures which Insure the continu-
ance and the strengthening of that 
solidarity. 
For years I have been convinced that 
cultural Interchanges are among the 
most effective supparts of our forelcn 
palicy. Tile principles upan which our 
own Nation was founded, and the way 
ot life \\'hlch we have developed, have 
enlarged the horizons of mankind. 'I1lo 
better we are understood, the more pro-
ductive will be our dealings with the 
rest of the world. I glimpsed this truth 
first In my own student days. My later 
experience as a teacher confirmed lt. 
The encouragement of interchanges 
productive of such understanding has 
been one of my constant preoccupat ions 
both as a Member of the lower House 
and as a Member of this body. 
A dozen years ago. in 1942, at a eon-
terence with a group of Indiana edu-
catorc. I become actively Interested in 
the impOrtance of educational exchanges 
as a pawerful agency in furthering in-
ter-American relatiOns. Together we 
worked out a resolution, which I intro-
duced March 1, 1943. providing for a 
scholarship arrangement and a clearing-
house for Information serving our 21 Re· 
publics. As a. member of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee in the 80th Congress, 
In cooperation with ~he Senator from 
New Jersey !Mr. SMJTHJ, I introduced 
the Smith-Mundt Act which wa.'l dc-
si~ned to prevent the program of cul-
tural interchange from going down the 
drain. My belle! Is no Jess strong now 
than then-If anything, it Is stronger-
that as the peoples of this hemisphere 
grow in knowledge and understanding of 
one another, their mutual determina-
tion to work to~:ether for the common 
good, to stand shoulder t~ shoulder for 
the common security, correspondincly 
1J1creascs. 
This seems to me especially true as re-
gards the exchange of students and of 
leaders. There Is no better way of learn-
ing to know our fellow man than by 
seeing him going about his daily tasks, 
revealing himself as we do reveal our-
selves when we are at home and at ease. 
Our governmental program of exchanrre 
or persons has proved its worth time and 
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